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THE NOTION OF 'CAUSA' 
ANTHONY RUTTER GIAPPONE 
INTRODUCTION 
As a general doctrine 'causa' was not developed under Roman 
Law. It was only developed by the commentators of Roman Law in 
the nineteenth century. At most it was considered under the head­
ing of 'object' which had to be possible and lawful. This close 
identification of 'causa' with object tended to obscure the deve­
lopment of 'causa' the doctrine of which was often confused with 
that of obj er;:t. 
This close identification of 'causa' with object is still to be 
found in the English Law of Contract. In fact, 'consideration' is
defined by Morley and Whitley in their Law Dictionary as: 
'a compensation, matter or inducement, or quid pro quo for some­
thing promised or done. A valuable consideration is necessary 
to make binding every contract no t under seal. It need not be 
adequate consideration, but must be of some value in the age of 
the law and must be legal. It must also be present or future - it 
must not be past.' 
Later on, Sutton and Shannon commenting on this definition, point­
ed out tha't a valuable consideration may consist either in some 
right, interest, project or benefit accruing to one party, or in some 
forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or un­
dertaken by the other. 
Thus, the English notion of consideration is very similar to 
what we call the subject matter or object df the contract. In fact, 
our Section 1025 defines subject matter as: 
'a thing which one of the contracting parties binds himself to 
give, or to do, or not to do'. 
But there is no doubt that our Code, like the Italian Code, expres­
sly requires in Section 1007 (art.· 1325 of the Italian Civil Code) 
the element of 'causa' or 'consideration' as an essential element 
for the validity of a contract and this as a distinct element from 
that of subject matter. Moreover, neither our Civil Code, nor the 
Italian Code defines 'causa' and so for this purpose we must refe r 
to commentators and textwriters. 
First of all, we must be careful not to confuse the juridical 
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meaning of the word 'causa' with the meaning given to that word 
by common parlance. 
Thus Torrence warns: 
'Per ben comprendere il concetto di "causa", occorre anzirutto 
tener presence che l'espressione "causa" non e adoperata nel 
significato comune, per cui essa designa l'antecedente di un de­
terminato evento (es. malattia causa della morte), ma nel signifi­
cato di fine, scopo.' 
It is important to ·keep this distinction in mind because the confu­
sion of these meanings has tended to make even more difficult the 
understanding of the notion of 'causa'. 
DEFINITION 
Let us now look at some definitions of 'causa'. Pacifici Mazzoni 
teaches: 
'Per causa •.•.• s'intende il motivo giuridicamente sufficiente a 
determinare ambedue i contraenti od uno di essi ad obligarsi. 
Questa causa e ben distinta dal motivo di fatto che puo avere 
indotto le parti a formare il contratto.' 
Therefore, here, 'causa' is the consideration in view of which 
each of the parties binds himself. In an onerous contract, the con­
sideration is the reciprocal performance of each of the contracting 
parties to the contract. As Pacifici Mazzoni puts it: 
'A titolo oneroso e •causa" suffi.ciente dell 'obbligazione il van­
taggio che ciascuno dei contraenti intende procurarsi, per effetto 
diretto del contratto, avuto riguardo alla sua speciale natura.' 
3ut a difficulty arises as regards the donee or the recipient in 
the case of a gratuitous contract. In gratuitous contracts the party 
who binds himself does not stipulate any consideration in his fa­
vour, and, therefore in such contracts the intention of performing an 
act of liberality or of bounty takes the place of the intention of ob­
taining such consideration. Indeed, the same writer goes on: 
'A titolo gratuito e "causa" sufficiente dell'obbliga zione l'intenz­
ione di esercitare un'atto di liberalita o di rendere. servizio.'
Pacifici Mazzoni's definition and notion of 'causa' is a clear il-
lustration of the doctrine of 'causjl' as it was generally understood 
in the early twentieth century./This doctrine had induced some 
writers to maintain that it is useless to talk of 'causa' in bilateral 
contracts, because whenever we refer to the inexistence or to the 
unlawfulness of cause, there is always at the same time the inex­
istence of the object or an unlawful object. So that if a thing sold 
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does not  exist, the inexistence of the object is sufficient to ex• 
plain the invalidity of the sale both as regards the seller, and as 
regards the purchaser. So these latter hold that object and 'causa' 
go together. 
Pacifici Mazzoni, in fact, acknowledges -this intimate relation­
ship between the notion of 'causa' and that of object. But he says 
that the difference between them is brought about according to the 
attitude which is to be taken when considering the one and when 
considering the other. Thus, when considering the 'causa', one 
looks at both 'prestazioni' together, while when considering the 
subject matter, they are considered as two and distinct. Thus he 
writes: 
'Nei contratci bilaterali la •causa" della obbligazione di una del• 
le pa.rti si confonde coll'oggetto della obbligazione dell'altra; di­
modoche la teoria della "causa" di questi contratti e legata inti­
mamente• con quella dell'oggetto; v'ha soltanto differenza nel 
modo di considerarli; quaodo trattasi dell' oggetto, la prestazione 
dovuta da ciascuoo delle parti e considerata in se medesima e
isolatamente quando trattasi della "causa", le prestazioni reci­
procameote dovute si consideranno l'una in opposizione dell' alt-
ra.' 
Indeed from the point of view of subject matter there are two ob­
jects involved in a bilateral contract. In sale, for example, the 
price is the object of the purchaser, and the article co be bought is 
the object of the vendor; while, on the other hand, the 'causa' of 
this contract is the reciprocal performance of both obligations. 
Thus, if we accept the equiparation of 'causa' to object, if a thing 
sold does not exist, the inexistence of the object promised by one 
of the parties to the contract, does not imply that the obligation of 
the other party (which is separate and distinct from the former) is 
devoid of all the elements necessary for its validity, since the ob­
ject of the obligation of the buyer is the price. Thus the buyer 
would still be bound co pay the price. But if 'causa' is the recipro­
cal performance, then this contract is invalid because one of its 
elements is lacking. 
Moreover, the 'anti-causalistes' (i.e. those who maintain that the 
notion of 'causa' is redundant) try to support their theory by em­
phasising the connection between the obligations which arise from 
bilateral contracts, saying that each of the parties only binds him­
self in view of what he obtains in return. However, this so-called 
'rule of correlatives' which can be equated to the English concept 
of the 'quid pro quo', is in fact nothing but the application of the 
theory of 'causa' itself. 
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On the other hand, in the case of unilateral contracts, as Pacifi­
ci Mazzoni says: 
'l'oggetto e la "causa" dell'obbli gazione sono distinti'. 
MODERN NOTION 
The notion of 'causa' has, during the last thirty or forty yea rs, 
developed into something quite different. The 'causa' is in reality 
the ECONOMIC FUNCTION of the contract, or as Torrence puts it, 
'la funzione economico-sociale del negozio'. 
Thus, the contract of sale, for example, is a contract by means of 
which property is transferred on a commutative basis, and, in so 
doing, serves a social purpose. The Italian Corte di Cassazione in 
a judgement delivered in 1966, defined 'causa' in this way: 
'la "causa" del negozio giuridico deve essere individuate nella 
finalita economico-sociale che il negozio stesso in concreto e 
destinato a realizzare e che l'ordinamento giuridico posicivo ri­
conosca degna di tutela ai propri fini '. 
'Causa', therefore, is the 'fine, scopo' towards which the con­
tract as a whole aims. In other words, 'causa' is the result which 
the contract aims to achieve and it is only in so far that the law 
considers this result to serve a social and economic function that 
the law extends its protection and sanctions that contract. In other 
words, it aims at producing a result which the law considers to be 
an economic-social function and as such it considers it worthy of 
extending its protection to such a contract. Indeed as Torrence 
says: 
'Ogni negozio deve avere la sua "causa", perche ogni negozio 
deve corrispondere ad uno scopo socialmente apprezzabile'. 
This notion of 'causa' has also been accepted by Italian case 
law. In fact, the Corte di Cassazione in 1947 held: 
'La "causa" di un negozio giuridico sta nella funzione economi­
ca-sociale del negozio stesso che e la sola rilevante e la sola 
tutelata dalla legge'. 
From this we realise that 
'Questo non concede riconoscemento e protezione agli atti posti 
in essere dall'autooomia privata, se la loro funzione o, se si 
vuole, il risultato a cui tendono, non corrisponde ad un'esigenza 
sociale' (Torrence). 
Thus, in the Law of Persons and in the case of unilateral con­
tracts, the law does not accept any legal effects produced by a 
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contract except for those contracts which fulfill a social function, 
and these particular contracts 'sono gia. fissate e prestabilite 
dall'ordinamente stesso'. On the other hand, in the field of patri­
monial rights, contracts may be divided. into two kinds, namely, 
nominate and innominate contracts. Now, the function to which the 
most important bilateral contract may adhere 'sono state considera­
ti dal legislatore'. Thus, in the case of nominate contracts, their 
aim or 'causa' is regulated by the law itself. Thus, for instance, 
the 'ca�sa' in every contract of sale is the transfer of a thing for a 
price. This, therefore, is considered to be an economic function 
worthy of protection. But in the case of innominate contracts, more 
individual liberty is allowed to the parties because 'esse possono 
anche condudere contratti che non appartengon o ai tipi aventi 
disciplina particolare'. Therefore, as far as innominate contracts 
are concerned, their 'causa' is determined by the will of the part­
ies so long as this 'causa' is lawful in terms of sections 1030 and 
1033. Indeed, Torrente brings out clearly this distinction between 
nominate and innominate contracts: 
'Si distingue, percio, i contratti TIPICI, i quali sono gia discip­
linati dal legislatore ( es. compravendita, mandato) ecc. e i con­
tratti ATIPICI o innominati, che non sono stati contemplati dal 
legislatore, ma che pur sono diretti a soddisfare esigenze degni 
di protezione'. 
Thus, to conclude on this point, we may refer to Messineo, who 
teaehes that .e.ve,ry co.ntra1;t bas a particular economic-social func­
tion which the legal system considers relevant for its own purpos­
es. It is this, the writer says, that is the sole reason for justifyin·g 
the safeguard which the legal system extends to this private act. 
'Ogni negozio giuridico assolve a una sua funzione economica 
e sociale caratteristica, che l'ordinamento giuridico _riconosce 
rilevante ai suoi fini e che solo giustifica la tutela, dall 'ordina­
mento stesso accordata all'autonomia privata' . 
Messineo then goes on to explain what one should understand by 
'funzione del negozio': 
'la funzione del negozio sta nell'apprestare al singolo uno 
strumento, per la modificazione di una data situazione e per il 
conseguimento di dati risultati giuridici (leciti) in relazione 
agli svariatissimi bisogni della vita. Suol dirsi che nella detta 
funzione risiede la "CAUSA" in senso oggettivo, del negozio; 
la quale, oltre tutto, serve a individuare il dato tipo del negozio, 
di fronte a tutti gli altri tipi'. 
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As we have seen, 'causa' is the 'aim' or 'scope' of the contract. 
But this 'causa' - even in innominate contracts - is different and 
must be distinguished from the MOTIVE which induces the parties 
to enter into a contract. Thus, Pacifici Mazzoni writes: 
'La "causa" dev' es sere tenuta ben distinta dal motivo; questo e 
un elemento accidentale e variabile, quasi estraneo al contratto: 
quella invece ne e un'elemento essenziale, la ragione d'essere 
intrinsica'. 
Torrence brings out this distinction by arguing that 'causa' is
the scope of the contract taken from the objective point of view, 
so that the 'causa' or 'scope' is present in every contract of that 
type; while on the other hand, the motive is subjective and varies 
according to the individual parties in the contract: 
'Causa e, dunque lo scopo a cui il negozio mira, ma questo sco­
po dev'essere inteso - secondo l'opinione prevalence - in senso 
oggettivo e dev'essere tenuto distinto dai motivi. I motivi sono 
rappresentazioni purche individuale e variano, percio, da caso a 
caso, da soggetto a soggetto. 
Prendiamo per esempio la compravendita: il vendi co're vende per­
che ha bisogno di denaro, o per fare una speculazione, o perche 
la cosa non gli va piu a genio; il compratore perche vuol fare 
una. speculazione, o perche vuol regalarla ad un amico: tutti 
questi sono motivi individuali che la parte puo non communicare 
alle persone con cui contratta, e che spesso, percio restano nel­
la sua sfera psichica interna e sfuggono alla cognizione delle 
altre persone. Pero, in ogni compravendita, v'e peraltro sempre 
un da·to costante comune; lo scambio di cosa contro il corrispet­
tivo denaro. A questo scopo, a questo risultato costante, a ques­
ta funzione serve nella infinita varieta di casi concreti il ne­
gozio di compravendita.' 
This distinction between 'causa' and motive is very important be­
cause while 'causa' is an essential requisite for the validity of 
any contract (sec. 1050), on the other hand, 'i moventi subbietti vi 
•••• non hanno, di regola, rilevanza giuridica' (Cass. 1947). 
Before proceeding to discuss the various theories which con­
cern the doctrine of 'causa', we have to solve a preliminary diffi­
culty. Whereas the Italian Code speaks of 'causa' of contracts, 
our Code speaks at times of 'causa' of contracts and at other times 
of 'causa' of the obligation. Thus, section 1007 e�wnerates 'cau­
sa' as one of the requisites for the validity of a contract. Section 
1007 in fact reads as follows: 
'The following are the conditions essential to the validity of the 
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contract: 
(a) capacity of the parties to contract;
(b) consent of the party who binds himself;
(c) a certain thing which constitutes the subject matter of the 
contract; 
( d) a lawful consideration.
The Code then goes on to take each of these conditions separately 
under their particular relevant title and states the provisions 
re­garding them. It must be noted that with regard to 'causa', the title 
the law gives to the preceding series of provisions is in line with s. 
1007 and is entitled 'Of the consideration o·f conduct'. However the 
first provision under this subtitle instead refers to the 'causa' of the 
obligation, and in fact reads as follows: 
'An obligation without a consideration, or founded on a false or 
unlawful consideration, shall have no effect'. 
This inconsistency cannot be justified by arguing that a contract 
and an obligation are. synonymous, because though in unilateral 
contracts there is only one obligation, this is not. so in the case of 
bilateral contracts or of multilateral contracts. This would there­
fore suggest that in our law, besides the notion of 'causa' of con­
tracts, there is also the notioo of the 'causa' of the obligation ut 
S1C. 
It has been rightly argued· that to accept that the doctrine of 
'causa' applies to the obligation taken separately would make such 
a doctrine useless because the 'causa' of one party would be the 
object of the other party, and vice-versa. Moreover, it would also 
follow that although the obligation of one of the parties has no ef­
fect because it lacks a 'causa', the obligation of the other party 
may be still due and this because every obligation in a contract is 
looked at separately and not as there being one 'causa' in a con­
tract. 
There is no doubt, however, that the Code refers to the 'causa' 
of the contract taken as a whole. Indeed, this can be clearly seen 
when we consider the modern notion of 'causa' which contemplates 
the function of that particular taken as one whole. Perhaps, the 
reason why the legislator speaks of an obligation in section 1030 
is that he wants to make it clear that in bilateral contracts there 
may be an unlawful or false 'causa' only in regard to one of the 
contracting parties. 
Though, as we have seen, every contract in order to be valid 
must have a 'causa', there are certain contracts - NEGOZI AST­
RATTI - which produce their effect even though their 'causa' is 
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temporarily put aside. In regard to 'negozi astratti' Torrente teach­
es: 
'Cio non esclude che, in alcuni negozi, gli effetti si producono 
astraendosi o prescindendosi dalla "causa", la quale resta, per 
cosf dire, accaotonata'. 
In these cases, 'causa' is not relevant, but its effects are mere-
ly suspended - but they DO exist. Thus, 
'Anche nei negozi astratti la "causa" ha la sua rilevanza, nel 
senso cbe la sua inesistenza o la sua illecita toglie efficacia 
all' attribuzione patrimoniale, ma la reazione dell' ordinamento 
giuridico e, per cosi dire, ad effetto ritardato.' 
A typical illustration is a contract involving a Bill of Exchange. 
Thus, A buys an object and pays with a Bill of Exchange, which 
is in tum passed on to a third person. Now even if there is an un• 
lawful 'causa' in the original contract of sale, A bas to honour the 
Bill of Exchange, but he can then make an action to tty and get 
back what he had paid - probably not from the person whom he had 
paid but from the vendor. Thus, Torrente goes on: 
'il negozio produce i suoi effetti, ed occorre, pertanto, eseguire 
la prestazione che ne fonna l'oggetto: si puo peraltro, agire per 
la restituzione, se la "causa" non esisteva o era illecita'. 
The reason why the law recognizes these 'negozi astratti' is be­
cause 'essi servono a facilitare l'acquisto e la circolazione dei 
diritti'. 
OUR LAW 
Section 1030 of our Civil Code reads as follows: 'An obligation 
without a consideration, or founded on a false or unlawful consi­
deration, shall have no effect'. 
In this short provision our law enunciates the whole doctrine of 
'causa' (Smith vs Lawrence - XXVIIl.ii.4). Indeed, this is why the 
notion of 'causa' is still very confused and ill-defined in our law. 
In order to examine this notion, we will discuss it according to the 
various concepts which emerge from this provision, namely: 
(i) the inexistence of- 'causa';
(ii) false causa 
(iii) unlawful 'causa'.
THE INEXISTENCE OF 'CAUSA' 
'Skond 1030, l'obbligazzjoni minghajr kawi;a m'gb.andha ebda ef­
fect •••• • (Pullicino vs Mifsud - XXXIV.iii.734). 
The inexistence of the 'causa' may be of two types. As Torrente 
classifies them, these are: 
(i) 'mancanza genetica della "causa"' and
(ii) 'mancanza funzionale della "causa'"
(i) Mancanza genetica della 'causa'.
Torrente defines this in the following terms: 'la "causa" puo
mancare fin dall'origine, dalla genesi del negozio'. 
We must here distinguish between nominate and innominate con­
tracts, when considering the inexistence of 'causa' in the light of 
modem development. Torrente explains that it is obvious that in 
the case of nominate contracts, we cannot, at least in theory, 
speak of the inexistence of 'causa', because the 'causa' of such a 
contract is pre-established by the law itself. 
However, 
'Essa puo, peraltro, mancare nel caso -concreto; cio che avviene 
quando, per la situazione in cui dovrebbe operare il negozio non 
puo esplicare la sua funzione'. 
Thus, for instance, the contract of sale is regulated by the law and 
consists in the transfer of the ownership of a thing in return for a 
price. Now, suppose I buy a thing which is already mine (both 
parties being unaware of the fact until the contract is conclu<l:ed). 
It .is evident that the con tract can never bring about the transfer 
of ownership, and therefore it can be said that, in practice, the 
contract is without a 'cause'. 
On the other band, in the case of innominate contracts, their 
'causa' is regulated by the wills of the parties. Now in these con­
tracts, the 'causa' is inexistent when the aim of the contract is 
not directed to produce any function, which the law considers 
worthy of its protection. 'Nei oegozi atipici la causa manca, quan­
do il negozio non e diretto a realizzare interessi meritevoli di tu­
tela (se, per esempio, il negozio e diretto ad uno scopo futile)' 
(Torrence.) 
It may happ en that the 'causa ', though lacking from the begin• 
ning, lacks only in part - this is called idifetto genetico parziale 
dell a •causa" '. The above mentioned writer explains this: 
'll difetto parziale della "causa" coosiste nella separazione tra 
gli interessi rispettivamente sacrificati con ii contratto'. 
For this notion to arise, 
'basterebbe che le due prestazioni non siaoo equivalenti: ma per 
la sicurezza della contrattazione la legge attribuisce relevaoza 
al difetto di 'causa' solo se lo squilibro tra la prestaziooe di
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una pacte e il corrispettivo assuma proporzioni iniqui o snaturali 
(oltre la meta: azione generale di rescissione per lesione)'. 
Now while 'la mancanza originaria' of the 'causa' makes the 
contract null and void according to section 1030, 'il difetto parzia­
le' of the 'causa' does not produce the nullity of the contract, but 
it gives the party suffering the damages the right t o  rescind the 
contract. 
Therefore 'causa' is wanting from the very moment in which the 
contract is entered into when the particular thing promised by one 
of the contracting parties does not exist at that moment, or is 
'extra commercium', or when the promiser binds himself not to per­
form a given act which had already been performed, or when the 
promiser binds himself to do something beyond human possibility, 
or when a person binds himself in view of a preference which he 
beli�ves already to exist, whilst in fact there has been no such 
performance or no pre-existing obligation. In hazardous contracts 
there is lack of 'causa' when there is no risk in compromise, when 
there is no uncertainty with regard to the issue of the law suit. 
'Causa' is related to some future event in the 'pacta de re spera­
ta'; if the future thing does not come into existence, so that the 
party who has promised it cannot fulfill this obligation, the 'causa' 
of the obligation for the other party ceases to exist. 
(ii) Mancanza funzionale della causa
Torrente defines this:
'Pur esistendo originariamente la "causa", per vicende succes­
sive, non sia piu realizzabile il risultato a cui il negozio era di­
ritto'.
Indeed, it may happen that though the 'causa' existed at the mo­
ment of conclusion of the contract, some new circumstances may 
supervene which make the execution of the contract, and therefore, 
the fulfilment of its function, impossible. Torrence calls this 'di­
fetto sopravenuto o funzionale della "causa"'. In other words, 
certain circumstances may subsequently arise which prevent the 
'causa' from functioning. Thus, for instance, in the contract of 
sale, the buyer may refuse to pay the price or a law may be sub­
sequently enacted prohibiting the transfer to others of such a thing. 
The 'causa' is, therefore, again defective, and special provisions 
apply for the rescission of the contract or the recovery of anything 
which may have been given in anticipation of the corresponding 
obligation which is never fulfilled. 
Therefore, 'causa' may also cease to exist after the conclusion 
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of the contract, in which case the contract cannot be regarded as 
null, but the fact that the obligation is not performed, which im­
plies the inex.istence of the consideration of one of the parties, 
must also entitle the creditor of such obligation not to fulfill his 
obligation, because justice demands equality between the parties; 
and good faith does not allow one party to demand the fulfilment 
of the obligation by the other, when he himself does not fulfill his 
own. This shows that, properly speaking 'causa' is not only the 
promise of a performance, but also the fulfilment of that obligation. 
'Causa' in the 'pacta de re sperata' may be related to some fu­
ture event. Now, if the future event does not come into existence, 
so that the party who has promised it cannot fulfill this obligation, 
the 'causa' of the contract is considered to be inexistent and the 
general rules of contract apply. Thus, Giorgi writes 
'una obligazione contrattuale e senza "causa" quando ,' e ssendo 
relativa al futuro, non siasi verificata •.• .' 
This principle was accepted in the case Axiaq vs Caruana (XL.i. 
548). In this case, a person booked a car from a car agent, and 
later sold the right to that to another person. Now it happened that 
in the meantime, importation of that particular model was prohibit­
ed and so the Court held that 
'dak il-bejgh ma jistax ikollu effect, u dak li ceda 1-bejgn ta' 
dik il-karozza huwa ritenut li jrodd lic-cessjonarju s-somma ta' 
flus li dan kien tah in konsiderazzjoni ta' dik ic-cessjoni'. 
It must here be noted that impossibility of performance is equi­
valent to inexistence of 'causa'. This has been expressly stated 
in the above mentioned case Axiaq vs Caruana where it was held: 
'Meta 1-"kawza" t'obbligazzjoni hija impossibbli b'mod assoiut 
il-kawi;a hija inesistenti u ghalhekk 1-obbligazzjoni m 'ghandha 
ebda effect glialiex hija minghajr "causa" .' 
Finally we must note that section 1030, regarding the inexis­
tence of 'causa', must be read in conjunction with section 1031. 
Thus, in the case Pullicino vs Mifsud (XXX
I
V.iii.734) the Court 
held: 
'Ghalkemm skond 1-art. 1030 1-obbligazzjoni .minghajr ftkawza" 
m'ghandha ebda effect, oppure skond 1-art. 1031 il-ftehim jibqa' 
jsehh jekk jigi pruvat li kien hemm kawi;a bii::zejjed gnalkemm 
mhux espressa. Hija bizzejjed ghaldaqstant il-"causa sotto­
intesa o p resunca• kif isejhilha I-Giorgi'. 
Now the question arises, is this 'causa' always presumed or 
must it be proved? Some writers like Duranton and Aubry et Rau 
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maintain that it is up to the person alleging to prove that the 'cau­
sa' though not expressed, in fact exists. On the other hand, Demo­
lombe holds that unless the contrary is proved, the 'causa' must 
always be presumed. The Italian Civil Code accepted the latter 
doctrine in a specific provision which does not exist in our Code. 
The position accepted by our courts as can be seen from the last 
mentioned case is that: 
'11-prova li kien hemm "kawza" tmiss lill-attur fis-sistema tal­
ligi Malcija . .•• 1-art. 1031 juri bic-car li meta ma hijiex espres­
sa 1-"kaw:zan ma hijiex pre:zunta, izda ghandha cigi pruvata'. 
Section 1031 reads: 
'The agreement shall nevertheless be valid, if it is made to ap­
pear that such agreement was founded on a sufficient considera­
tion, even though such consideration was not stated', 
This argument was also upheld in the case reported in XI..11.iii,1207, 
An interesting case regarding the inexistence of 'causa' occurred 
in 1947. A father transferred bis property in favour of his four 
children in consideration of a life annuity in his favour, The father 
was about 7 4 years, and the amount transferred was about £70,000, 
and the annuity created was for £6000 a year. Now if calculated, 
it will be seen that property of £70,000 would always have an in­
come of £3000/ £4000, so that the father was only making a pro­
fit of £2000/ £3000 and would have had to live for a very long 
time, so that there would be due element of risk involved on the 
part of the children. The court held that this contract was invalid 
because the 'causa' of a life annuity as a hazardous transaction 
is the risk, which did not exist in this case. Therefore, it was no 
life annuity because the parties did not stand to the risk of loss 
or gain, because one party was always gaining and the other al­
ways losing. Moreover, as the father was 74 years of age, there 
was neither a valid donation, because no person over 70 years can 
make a donation. Therefore, it could not even be said to be 'falsa 
causa'. Thus the contract of life annuity was held to be invalid 
Finally, it must be remembered and emphasised that the English 
doctrine of consideration must not be equated to the continental 
doctrine of 'causa' - our legislator has been unwise in translating 
the Latin word 'causa' to the English word 'consideration' be­
cause the English doctrine is very much different. Thus for exam­
ple, in a case in Mal ta when a yacht worth about £10,000 was 
sold for £1, an English lawyer held that there was consideration. 
From our point of view, we do not take such a mathematical view 
of 'consideration', because in our view 'causa' of the contract of 
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sale is the commutative character of the transaction and there must 
be some sort of proportion between the price and the thing sold. Of 
course, there is no remedy if the price is too low or too high, be­
cause except for immovable property, one cannot in sci cute an ac­
tion on 'laesio'. But if the price is not a serious price, then it will 
not be sale - it may of course be something else e.g. a donation. 
There is another case which brings out the distinction between 
the English notion of consideration and our doctrine of 'causa'. 
Four English friends while in Malta hired a car to go on a picnic 
and on their way back they collided causing about £M350 worth of 
damages. All these went to the garage owner and signed a docu­
ment stating that they ALL bind themselves to pay the damages by 
allotting £M20 per month from their salary to be paid to the garage 
owner on account of the damages. But some time afterwards, two 
of these cancelled this allotment. When the matter was taken up 
with solicitors in England in order to try and enforce payment it 
was held that the transaction was in fact null because though there 
is consideration on the part of the driver arguing out of tort, there 
is no consideration for the other three. But from our point of view, 
the consideration of the other three is the fact that they signed a 
document standing security and this out of friendship, j use as in a 
donation. 
Thus we can clearly see that the whole concept of consideration 
in English law is something which is too artificial and legalistic 
and which has nothing to do with our notion of 'causa'. 
FALSE 'CAUSA' 
False 'causa' comes about when the 'causa' stipulated in the 
contract is not that intended by the parties that contract. Now, 
this inconsistency may be due either to error or to  intentional de­
viation i.e. simulation. Thus the Court in the case Pullicino vs. 
Mifsud XXXIV.iii.734 held that a false 'causa' is equivalent to no 
'causa' at all. Thus it said: 
'Kawza falza hija daqs li kieku m'hemmx kawza. U kawza falza 
tfisser kawza erronea jew simulata'. 
Pacifici Mazzoni also teaches that false 'causa' can be divided 
into two types and he goes on to define these two classes of false 
'causa'. 
""Causa" Erronea: quando una delle parti si e ob bli gata per una 
"causa" immaginaria che supponeva reale; 
"Causa" simulata: quando ambedue le parti hanno indicato una 
"causa" che sapevono non esistente.' 
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Now, when the 'causa' of a contract is false, the rule 'plus va­
let quod agitur quam quod simulati concipitur' is applied. So that 
in the case of absolute simulation of the 'causa' of the contract, 
the contract shall have no effect; in the case of a relative simula­
tion section· 1032 applies, namely, 'where the consideration stated 
is false, the agreement may, nevertheless, be upheld if another con­
sideration is proved.' 
Let us now consider this principle that if there is absolute si­
mulation the contract is null while in the case of relative simula­
tion the true 'causa' subsists. 
Ia the case Abela vs Galdes (XVI pg.59) the defendant had been 
left part of an inheritance subject to the condition that before he 
takes possession of his quota he must p ay £50 to plaintiff 'so 
that she may be compensated for the great expense which she and 
her family incurred in sending him (defendant) to be educated 
abroad.' Defendant alleged 'falsa causa' because neither the 
plaintiff nor her family had contributed in any way towards his 
education since for that purpose he had borrowed £M300 from his 
father which he had paid back. In this case the Court, per Debona 
J ., held: 
'Una disposizione testamentaria fondata sopra una "causa" fal­
sa che solo l'abbia determinato il testatore non ha effetto'. 
In the case, Sciberras Trigona vs Calleja Schembri (XIII.p. 101) 
it was held that when an obligation of 'mutuum' stipulates a sum 
of money higher than that which is in fact given in the 'mutuum', 
the 'causa' therein expressed must be held to be false. Neverthe­
less, one cannot conclude from this fact alone, that the same obli­
gation ought not to produce any effect owing to this excess, for 
according to law, when the 'causa' expressed in an obligation is
false (as in fact part of the 'causa' in the impugned obligation of 
this case), the contr�ct may nevertheless be up held on procuring 
the existence of another 'causa'. The other 'causa' was proven m 
this particular case, by the sale of a piano. 
It must be noted that in case of relative simulation in order that 
the contract may subsist according to the true 'causa', this 'cau­
sa' must not be prohibited by the law in any way. This point has 
been clearly brought out by our case law. We can here refer to the 
already mentioned case where the father who was over 70 years of  
age granted a life annuity. Also, in the case Grech vs Zammit 
(XVI. p. 332) the Court, per G. Pullicino J., held: 
'Trattandosi di simulazione relativa, e non assoluta, l'atto e va­
lido se, simulati la "causa" ed il titolo del contratto i contraen­
ti, intendono compiere un atto non riprovato dalla legge'. 
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An interesting point arising from the case Cachia Slythe vs. Ca­
chia Zammit (XXIX) regarded the prescription of the 'causa' to an­
nuli such a contract. The Court held that if the true 'causa' �hich 
was simulated was in fact an illicit 'causa', then the action to an­
null the contract must be brought within 2 years; while on the other 
hand if the true 'causa' is licit, then that contract is never null, 
and so the two year prescription is not applicable here. The Court 
said: 
'Jekk il-"kawza;' taparsi, li ssemmiet f'kuntratt dehret biex tah­
bi "kawz:a" illecita, dak il-kuntratt jista' jigi mnassar sakemm 
ma tkunx ghalqet il-preskrizzjoni ta'sentejn. Iz:da jekk il-"kaw­
za" taparsi kienet tahbi "kawza" lecita, m'hemm ebda nullica ta' 
dak il-kuntratt, u ghalhekk fuq talba gnal dikj arazzjoni cnill-Qor­
ti, tal-"kawza" tassew, il-preskrizzjoni ta' sentejn ghalxejn 
tingieb 'l quddiem;. 
An interesting case arose concerning the appointment of a 
player-coach of a local football club. Before the contract, the 
player made it clear that he wanted to be an amateur player, but 
wanted also to become the coach of the younger players of the 
club. The club agreed to register him as an amateur and employ 
him as a coach for the young players and this latter at a salary of 
£60 per month. But time passed and though he was called to 
play he was not asked to coach. Now, according to law, an ama­
teur player cannot receive more than a certain amount which was 
much lower than £60 a month. He demanded that he should be 
called in to coach according to the contract, but the club reiterat­
ed that his employment as a coach was only a screen to evade the 
law. But it was quite clear that this devious design of the club 
was not shown by the other party, because in reality the player's 
intention was to be genuinely employed as a coach. Be threatened 
to leave the club, but since he was being paid, he was a profes­
sional and could not leave without the club's consent. 
In the meantime the club stopped paying him the £60 and so 
he instituted an action against the club. The club pleaded the nul­
lity of that contract, because it was a violation of the rules con­
cerning amateurs. Thus the question arose: was the contract gen­
uine or was it simulated? If the contract was found to be simulat­
ed, it would have the effect of what it was really intended to be, 
unless the real intention is itself illicit, and therefore null. Now 
since no amateur player could legally be paid for his services as 
player, the club held that the genuine consideration of that contract 
was illicit and therefore the contract was null and void. 
Ultimately, the matter was decided by the English Football As-
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sociation, by way of appeal, and the player won his case, and it 
was accepted that he did not want to present a fac;ade at all, but 
this was his genuine intention - i.e. to play as an amateur and to 
be employed as a coach. Thus, though it is true that the other par­
ty intended the simulation, this was regarded as an abuse of one 
party against the other. 
Another interesting case decided by the Privy Council was the 
Formosa case, where an uncle made a transfer of a house to a ne­
phew of his, in order to settle accounts between them. Io point of 
fact, a dispute arose between them, and it resulted that there were 
no accounts to settle and the whole thing was all fiction and was 
only a way of how they wanted to donate property, without paying 
donation duty. This is a frequent abuse when donating property. 
Therefore, to conclude the distinction which has been made by 
our Courts between absolute and relative simulation can be ex ­
pressed as follows: 
Absolute Simulation: when the parties apparently enter into a con­
tract but in reality they do not create anything at all; 
Relative Simulation: when the simulated contract is intended to 
produce some effects, but these intended effects are different from 
what is stated in the contract. 
Therefore, falsity vitiates 'causa' and therefore also the con­
tract, but this only in so far as there is no true 'causa'. This 
links up with the in existence of 'causa'. 
UNLAWFUL CAUSA 
'L'ordinamento giuridico non riconosce e non tutela l'autonomia 
privata, se essa e diretta a scopi contrari alla legge e alle con­
cezioni morali comunemente accolta.' 
This principle has been categorically accepted by our law and 
in fact in the case Pace et noe. vs. Agius et noe ( 1957) (XLI.iii. 
689) the Court tells us when unlawful 'causa' exists:
'Skond 1-art. 1030 hija bla effett kwalunkwe obbligazzjoni magh­
mula fuq "kaw.za" illecita u skond 1-art. 1033 gie dikjarat li 1-
"kaw.za" hija illecita meta hija projbita mill-ligi jew kuntrarja 
ghall-ghemil :x:ieraq jew ghall-ordni pubbliku; u konvenzjoni hija 
kontra 1-ordni pubbliku meta hija kontra 1-interess generali'. 
In considering unlawful 'causa' we must distinguish this notion 
from the notion of the inexistence of 'causa'. Indeed, in the latter 
case, 'causa' is the immediate result of the contract (lo scopo) 
taken as a whole; it is the economic function of the contract, so 
that as such 'causa' cannot ever be unlawful or immoral. However, 
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when considering the notion of unlawful 'causa', 'causa' is taken 
to refer to the aims or motive which. the parties have in mind when 
contracting and which therefore can indeed be unlawful or immoral. 
In other words, for the notion of inexistence, 'causa' means the in­
tended result or the aim of the contract; while for the notion of 'un­
lawfulness', 'causa' means the motive of the parties. Thus, for 
example, if a person contracts to buy a brothel, the 'causa' for 
the purpose of 'inexistence' is the transfer of the brothel for 
the corresponding price; but on the other hand, for the purposes of 
'unlawfulness' the 'causa' is the intention of organising a brothel 
which is, no doubt, contrary to public policy. Therefore, solely be­
cause of this latter fact the contract is null (vide Mizzi vs. Cassar, 
infra). 
There is no doubt that in examining unlawful 'causa', our Courts 
have looked at the motive of the contracting parties. This can be 
seen in a number of cases. Thus in the case Bajada vs. Lamb the 
Court held: 
'Oak li hu importanti hu jekk il-"kawza" ta' 1-ghoti tal-flus jew 
oggetti ohra, ikunu meta jkunu moghtija, ikollhiex jew le rapport 
dirett mal-konkubinat, jew ahjar jekk il,-konkubinat kienx iV'kaw­
za" ta' 1-obbligazzjoni jew kienx merament 1-okkazzjoni; fl-ew­
wel kaz, 1-obbligazzjoni hi nulla, bhala illecita; fil-kaz 1-iehor 
hi lecita'. An identical case which came before the Courts was 
An identical case which came before the Courts was Borg vs 
P ortelli (XXXIX). 
Again in the case Scicluna vs. Chetcuci (XXXV .ii. 513) the 
Court manifested this point clearly: 
'll-"kawza" jew motiv impellenti jew determinanti tal-kontraen­
ti, sabiex waslu gnall-konvenzjonijiet u obbligazzjonijiet ••• 
kienet "kawza" direttament kontra 1-ligi ••• u kwindi illecita'. 
Again, a more recent case dealing with unlawful 'causa', in 
which 'causa' was clearly equated to motive was the case decided 
by Magri J., Mizzi vs. Galea in 1959 (XLIII.ii.648)
'll-tilas ta' rigal bhala kondizzjoni ghall-ghoti ta' kiri ta' djar 
huwa projbit mill-ligi. Dao ir-rigal projbit mill-ligi jikkostitwix­
xi "kawza" u oggett ta' 1-obbligazzjoni bejn il-kontendenti, u 
ghalhekk f'dan ir-rigward 1-obbligazzjoni hija illecita u m'ghand­
ha ebda eff ett'. 
Thus we can see that in order that the theory relating to unlaw­
ful 'causa' may have those effects which it should have in confor­
mity with tradition and with the principles of positive law, it must 
be kept distinct from the modern theory relating t o  the ine.x:istence 
of 'causa'. This is a case in point where the wording of our provi­
sion is illogical, because we find the word 'consideration' in sec­
tion 1030 being interpreted differently according to the adjectives 
which qualify it in the same notion itself. Though illogical, this is 
the position in Malta. 
On this point, Maltese and Italian doctrine differ considerably 
because Italian doctrine does not distinguish between the notion 
of the inexistence of 'causa' and that of unlawful 'causa', as we 
do. In other words, in Italian Law they do not inquire into the mo­
tive which the parties had in mind. Thus, these look at the 'cau­
sa' of the contract as defined above - economic-social function 
of the contract - and examine whether this function is lawful or 
not. Therefore, in Italian law - unlike in our law - a nominate 
contract which has its 'causa' established by the law cannot have 
an unlawful 'causa'. Thus Torrence explains: 
'S'intende che il problema dell'illecita della "causa" si pone 
soltanto per i negozi atipici o innominati: per quelli tipici la 
"causa" e gia riconosciuta dal legislatore che, appunto per 
questo li ha disciplinati'. 
Section 1033 of the Civil Code tells us what unlawful 'conside-
ration' is. This section reads: 
'The consideration is unlawful if it is prohibited by the law or 
contrary to morality or public policy'. 
Therefore, the 'causa' is unlawful in three circumstances, name­
ly, 
(i) when it is prohibited by the law;
(ii) when it is prohibited by public policy;
(iii) when it is prohibited by morality.
Let us consider these separately. 
By Law 
The 'causa' is considered to be unlawful because it is 'prohibit­
ed by the law' when the 'causa' goes against an express provision 
of the law; in other words, when the aim of the parties as expres­
sed is contrary to a provision in the law. In this respect we have 
already mentioned the case Mizzi vs Galea concerning 'il-hlas ta' 
rigal gb.all-gt\oti .ta' kiri ta' dar' and also the case Scicluna vs. 
Chetcuti et 1951 - XXXV .H.513. Another particular case in point 
is Borg vs. Caruana et ( 1950) (XXXIV.ii.637) where it was held: 
'L-attur kieo inkarika lill-konvenut biex iniziillu 1-art minn ab­
bord somma ta' flus u jikkonsenjaha lill-persuna o"1ra Malta. Il-
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konvenut ma kkonsenj ahomx. Billi 1-attur ried inizzel dawk il­
flus bi ksur ta' !-Finance Reg. 1942, il-Qorti zammet li 1-iskop 
ta' 1-inkariku kien illecicu u ghalhekk can.dee ic,-calba ca' 1-accur 
ghar-restituzzjoni ca' dawk il-flus.' 
In this respect, one could also mention the case reported in 
XX.XIX.i. at p. 371, which held that interest over 6% is against the
law; therefore a contract which is based on such a 'causa' is illi­
cit:
'Skond 1-art. 1949 cal-Kodici Civili, 1-imghax hu limitat ghas-6% 
u skond id-dispozizzjonijiet kombinati ca' 1 030 u 1033, 1-obbli­
gazzjoni ghall-imghax oghla minn dik ir-raca ma jista' jkollha 
ebda effect u ghalhekk hija inezistenti u nulla b'mod assoluc.' 
By Public Policy and Morality 
The question arises here, as to what are we to understand by 
public policy and morality. Now, Torrence explains this: 
'La ragione di negozio immorale o contrario al buon costume 
comprende non soltanto i negozi contrari alle regole del pudore 
sessuale e della decenza, ma piu in generale i negozi contrari a 
quei principi etici, che coscituiscono la morale sociale in quanco 
ad essi uniforma il suo comporcamento la generalica delle perso­
ne oneste, corrette, di buona fede e di sani principi in un deter­
minato ambience e in una determinata epoca.' 
Indeed, the Corte di Cassazione 1950 also had occasion to explain 
this point: 
'Diversi invece intendere per buon costume il complesso di quei 
principi etici che, suscettivi di venire universalmen te adotti, 
costituiscono la morale sociale, perche ad essi uniforma il suo 
comportamento la generalita delle persone oneste, corrette, di 
buona fede, e di sani principi, in un determinato ambience e in 
una determinata epoca'. 
All this seems to fit in the very general definition of public or­
der given by our Courts in the case Pace et ne vs. Agius et ne 
( 1957) - XU.iii .6 59: 
'konvenzjoni hija kontra 1-ordni pubblika meta hijakontra 1-inte­
ress generali'. 
As regards the notion of public order it was also stated by the 
Court of Appeal in the case Marmara vs. Caruana ed altri (XXII.i. 
193) that no passage of time or repetition of performance can justi­
fy a provision against public order. Thus the Court held:
'Nessun atto, per quanto liberamente consentito e talora ripetu-
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to, e nessun periodo di tempo, pur tempo, che sia, possono va­
lere a dare efficacia ad una obbligazione proibita per ragione di 
ordine publico'. 
It is sometimes debated whether it is right that a judge should 
have such a wide discretion since the law does not specify any 
criterion the judge should use. But even in Roman Law there was 
the concept of 'contra bonos mores' without there being any writ­
ten law stating what these 'bonos mores' were. Pacifici Mazzoni 
discusses this point and he says: 
'S'obbietta che e lasciato al giudice un ttoppo vasto campo 
d'arbitrio; ma e a riflettere che in questa materia, e specialmen­
te per cio che riguarda il buon costume, e inevitabile che il giu­
dice abbia liberta d' apprezzamento ad e meglio affidarsi all 'equo 
criterio e all'onesta di esso, piuttosto di tentare di porgli un 
£reno con formole piu o meno scieritifiche, ma sempre indetermi­
nate, che nella pratica applicazione recono piu danno che utile'. 
Giorgi is also of this opinion •. An interesting case which came 
before our Courts was Needham vs. Darmanin (XIII. p. 570). In this 
case the plaintiff had spent a sum of £34 owing to her noc work• 
ing during pregnancy, which eventually terminated in an abortion. 
She alleged that the defendant was the person responsible for the 
aborted foetus, in that she was being maintained by him, and at 
his expense. 
The Court held that concubinage being against religion and so­
cial custom, any obligation which derives therefrom, is of no ef­
fect. 
A great number of cases involving unlawful 'causa' are concern­
ed with obligation arising out of concubinage. On this point our 
Courts have been very categorical and have left no doubt chat this 
is against public policy and morality; thus in the case Muscat vs. 
Farrugia et (XXVII.ii-iv.250) the Court held: 
'E· radicalmente nulla l'obbligazione, che alcuno assume di pa­
gare una certa somma di denaro ad una donna come prezzo della 
promessa che quesca gli fa annodare e continuare con lui rela­
'zioni illeciti'. 
Another case on this point is found in XXXII.ii.170. 
The question now arises whether for a contract to be annulled on 
the ground of unlawful 'causa', both parties had to know about it 
or not. We must here distinguish between the following hypothes­
es: 
(a) tbe party who aims at an unlawful object cannot refuse to
fulfill his obligation to the detriment of the other party who is un-
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aware and who is therefore in good faith. In this case the maxim 
applies 'nemo auditur propriam turpetu.dinem alligens '; 
(b) on the contrary, the right of demanding the nullity of the con­
tract must be granted to the party who, after the conclusion of the 
contract becomes aware of the unlawful scope of the other party, 
because in such a way another obstacle is made to the realisation 
of an unlawful scope. 
Therefore, if A takes on lease a house from B for  £10 a month 
for the purpose of committing immoral acts therein, A cannot re­
fuse to pay the £10 to B demanding the annulment of the contract 
of lease on the ground that he entered into the contract with an un· 
lawful motive in mind, and this because 'nemo auditur propriam tur· 
pitudioem alligeos •. On the other hand, if B, after the conclusion 
of the contract, comes to know of A's unlawful motive, he may or 
may not demand the annulment of the contract at his option. 
Indeed, the principle underlying both hypotheses 1s expressly 
stated in section 1034(1) of our Civil Code: 
'Where the consideration for which a thing has been promised is 
unlawful only in regard to the obligee, anything which may have 
been given for the performance of the contract may be recovered'. 
It is important to note that together with the right to annull the 
contract the party in good faith to such a contract vitiated by an 
unlawful 'causa' has a right to demand the restitution of anything 
which he has paid or given in consideration of that contract. Thus, 
if I pay a sum of money for the re lease of a person he id hostage 
by bandits, the unlawfulness lies only with the bandits and I may 
therefore recover the money so given. (Torrence). 
According to section 1034 (2): 
'If the consideration is unlawful in regard to both contracting 
parties, neither of them, unless he is a minor, may recover the 
thing which he may have given to the other party . .  .' 
In this princi�le we find applied the rule 'in pa rti turpitudine 
melior est conditio possidentis'. Therefore, if both parties to the 
contract know of the unlawful 'causa', the contract is null and void 
for both �rties and none of them can claim back what he has al­
ready given. So that even if one of the parties has executed his 
obligation vis-a-vis the other party, even though the other party 
does not perform his part of the contract, the former has no legal 
means to recover what he has already given to the other party in 
contemp lation of the contract - vide the above-mentioned case 
Borg vs. Caruana (1950) - XXXIV.ii.637. 
There are quite a number of local cases illustrating this point. 
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Thus in the case Zammit vs. Caruana Scicluna (XXLi.534) the 
Court held: 
'L'illecitudine della "causa" per parte di ambedue i contraenti, 
impedisce la repetizione di quanto fu pagato per l'esercizio del 
contratto'. 
Again in the case Scicluna vs. Abela (XXXll.ii.574) 
'Meta 1-operazzjoni bija illecita gnaz-i:ewg nahiet, wiehed ma 
jistax jirrepeti minghand 1-ienor dale li  jkun tab in konnessjoni 
ma' dik 1-operazzjoni'. 
An interesting case is the case Fenech vs. Newly (XXl.i.290) 
where it was held that the fact that one rents a house for prostitu­
tion makes the lessee also a party to the unlawful contract in that 
he speculates on the exercise of prostitution. Therefore, the con­
tract can be annulled by both parties but none of them can demand 
the restitution of what has been given: 
'La locazione di un fondo, quando •..••• ha per oggetto anche 
per parte del locatore una speculazione nell'esercizio della pro­
stituzione, contiene una contrattazione immorale e quindi e aul­
la. E quantunque in simile contrattazioni la "causa" sia illecita 
per parte di ambedue i contraenti, pure ciascuno delle parti puo 
domandare la resoluzione del contratto, salvo la irrepetibilita 
delle prestazioni eseguite'. 
This provision of our law (section 1034) (2) is very similar to 
art. 1345 of the Italian Civil Code which says that a contract is 
unlawful when the parties are led to conclude it solely by an un­
lawful motive common to both. 
'Il contratto e illecito quando le parti si sono determinate a 
concludere esclusivamente per un motivo illecito comune ad en­
trambe'. 
This article is an exception to the above-mentioned Italian ge­
neral rule that nominate contracts cannot be annulled on the ground 
of unlawful 'causa '. This provision brings the Italian concept of 
'causa' close to ours, in that it considers the motive of the parties 
in both nominate and innominate contracts. However, this provision 
only applies when the same unlawful motive is the prime conside­
ration of both parties in contracting. Torrence and Pescatore dis­
cuss this provision of Italian law: 
'Questa anicolo condiziona la nullita del contratto alla circos­
tanza che ii motivo illedto sia stato il solo a determinare la vo­
lonta delle parti e sia comune ad entrambe ne 1 sen so che tutti
e due i contraeoti devono aver avuto un identico motivo e cioe 
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devooo esserv1 ispirati al perseguimeoto della stessa finalita 
illecita'. 
The case Mizzi vs. Cassar 
This recent case is interesting in that it pinpoints the various 
areas of difference between inexistence and unlawfulness of 'cau­
sa' in that the First Court found the first, and the Appeal Court, 
the second. 
Facts: Mizzi, Cassar (Texas Garage) and Falzon (Express Garage) 
were faced with the possibility of a tourist boom after the war. The 
three garages agreed to form a sort of partnership, by formal agree­
ment, whereby the three.would contribute in some way to the com­
mon good, and each would reap the profits. Mizzi did in fact make 
some attempt to attract tourist agents to Malta, and Falzon did, at 
times, help Cassar with extra cars, for which the latter always 
paid him. After eight years without distribution of profits, Mizzi 
and Falzon sued Cassar for such distribution. 
Commercial Court: The Court attempted to find out if the old con­
tact of partnership was valid and so had to ask the question 'Is 
there a "Causa "'? 
The Court held that the 'causa' was the desire of the three part­
ies to prevent competition among them. The contract was therefore 
with a 'causa'. 
Appeal Court: Appeal disagreed with the first Court on this same 
point, arguing: 
(i) The desire to prevent competition may be a MOTIVE of a
contract, but not a 'CA USA', and this latter is what is required as 
an essential element for the existence of a contract. 
(ii) Even if we say, as the First Court held, that this was the
'CAUSA' then it was an ILLICIT one, because trade should be free, 
and so should competition. 
So we still remain with the question was there a 'CAUSA'? The 
facts show that although in the contract, Mizzi and Falzon had 
promised to contribute, they had in actual fact performed very 
feeble attempts at fulfilling their obligation. It was held, therefore, 
by this Court that 
(a) as far as the CONTRACT is concerned, this had a 'causa',
because here a promise is enough for a 'causa' to exist; but 
(b) as far as the OBLIGATIONS are concerned, these (Cassar' s)
had no 'causa', because Mizzi and Falzon did not really perform 
their obligations: therefore, here a promise is not enough; there 
must be PERFORMANCE for a 'causa' of an obligation to exist. 
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CONCLUSION 
The writer hopes that it is by now clear that it is very difficult 
to regulate clearly and effectively a complex notion as that of 
'causa' in five short provisions as our Civil C ode tries to do. So 
that one can suggest that the adoption 'in toto' of the Ita lian doc­
trine of 'causa' would not only eliminate the ambiguities created 
by the use of the word 'oblig�tion' in lieu of the word 'contract' in 
section 1030, but would also ensure a better understanding of the 
notion of 'causa' in relation both to nominate and innominate con­
tracts and a better distinction of motive from 'causa'. 
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